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Exclusive Remedy Under 
Update on Exceptions to the 
Introduction 
T he enactment of the first workers' compensation legislation in 1911 was a reaction to modern industrial 
development of the early 20th century and 
the unjust results under the common law 
tort system. I Workers' compensation laws 
are designed to provide injured employees 
with a remedy for accidental injuries 
"arising out of and in the course of their 
employment." 2 Under workers' compen-
sation legislation an employee loses his 
common law tort remedies in exchange for 
a measure of guaranteed compensation 
without proof offault against the employer. 
The employer in turn is able to avoid the 
possibility of extremely high damage awards 
in exchange for a limited type of strict lia-
bility.3 Recently, however, employers have 
been subject to increased exposure to lia-
bility in industrial accidents. The once 
preclusive workers' compensation remedy 
is in danger of being eroded through ex-
ceptions to the exclusive remedy rule. 
This erosion has caused increased debate 
within the legal community concerning 
the future of workers' compensation. 
Historical Background 
Prior to the development of the concept 
of workers' compensation, an employee 
who was injured in the course of employ-
ment had to rely on common law tort ac-
tions against his employer. The injured 
employee had to prove that his injury was 
due solely to the negligence of his employer. 
On the other hand, the employer was able 
to utilize the defenses of contributory neg-
ligence, fellow servant rule and assump-
tion of risk. 4 This difficult burden of proof 
coupled with the defenses available to the 
employer resulted in very few judgments 
in favor of the injured employee or his de-
pendents. s 
4-The Law Forum/Winter, 1987 
by Stephen A. Markey, ill 
At this point in history the prevailing 
economic philosophy, as evidenced by 
common law decisions, was based on the 
"economic theory that there was complete 
mobility in labor, that the supply of work 
was unlimited, and that the worker was an 
entirely free agent, under no compulsion to 
enter into the employment." 6 The parties 
were allegedly free to contract. Also, an 
employer was generally not held liable for 
injuries caused solely by the negligence of 
fellow employees. This fellow servant rule, 
as it is commonly called, first appeared in 
the English case of Priestly v. Fowler.7 In 
Priestly the court held that an employee as-
sumes the risk of the negligence of his fel-
low servants when he accepts employment. 
The almost total lack of recovery under 
the common law rules, together with mod-
ern industrial conditions, helped to make 
the inequities under the common law sys-
tem more evident. This awareness helped 
to bring about statutory change in em-
ployers' liability for injuries to employees. 
During the first ten years of the twen-
tieth century, several states adopted em-
ployers' liability statutes. 8 These laws put 
strict limits on the common law defenses 
previously available to the employer, but 
still required the employee to prove the 
employer's negligence. Although these laws 
did little to improve the workers' plight, 
they paved the way for modern day work-
ers' compensation laws. 
In 1908 the first general workers' com-
pensation statute was enacted in the United 
States for the benefit of government em-
ployees. 9 This was soon followed in 1910 
by the first state workers' compensation 
legislation which was enacted in New 
York. 10 Today, every state and the District 
of Columbia, as well as American Samoa, 
Guam, Puerto Rico and the United States 
Virgin Islands, have enacted workers' 
compensation legislation. II Under these 
statutes an injured employee and his de-
pendents in the case of his death are able to 
recover compensation for the employee's 
disability or death, together with medical 
and certain other incidental expenses from 
the employer, regardless offault and with 
few exceptions. However, this right to 
compensation is the employee's exclusive 
remedy, and in the absence of a showing 
that the employer intentionally caused the 
injury, the employee has no right to sue his 
employer. Generally, workers' compen-
sation statutes, including the exclusive 
remedy provisions, have been held consti-
tutional. 12 
Most workers' compensation statutes 
provide for an exception to the exclusivity 
rule in the case of intentional torts on the 
part of the employer, and when the em-
ployer fails to secure workers' compen-
sation insurance. Even so, the basic exclu-
siveness rule, which becomes applicable 
either by compulsion or by the employer's 
election, authorizes as the exclusive rem-
edy of the employee or his dependents the 
right to receive a measure of guaranteed 
compensation from his employer and the 
employer's insurer. 13 The exclusive rem-
edy rule is "part of the quid pro quo" or 
balancing of sacrifices between employers 
and employees. 14 The employer assumes 
liability regardless of fault, but he is no 
longer subject to large damage verdicts. 
Therefore, an employee injured in the 
course of his employment, even if he has 
not applied for workers' compensation, 
will generally be barred from holding his 
employer liable in tort. IS 
The exclusiveness provision also pre-
cludes the employer from statutory tort 
liability under state and federal statutes, 
whenever the injury falls within the com-
pensation act. 16 In the absence of an excep-
tion to the general rule an employer will 
not be held liable under a statute such as a 
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survivorship statute, for injuries covered 
by workers' compensationY Even in the 
case of gross negligence on the part of the 
employer, the exclusiveness provision gen-
erally applies. 18 
At the inception of workers' compen-
sation legislation, the exclusive remedy 
trade off was not much of a sacrifice for 
workers. 19 However, as the common law 
tort remedies have expanded, so has the 
sacrifice. 20 This widening of the trade-off 
gap has caused a great deal of questioning 
of workers' compensation laws. 21 It has 
also caused legislators and many of the 
courts to carve out exceptions to the exclu-
sivity rule. 
Failure to Insure 
Today, every United States jurisdiction22 
requires employers to secure insurance, or 
to establish that they are able to provide 
self-insurance, for injured employees. 23 
The vast majority of these jurisdictions 
provide that an employer who has failed to 
secure insurance and is not properly self.. 
insured may be held liable to suit with his 
"common law defenses abrogated." 24 In 
fact, the workers' compensation statutes 
in two jurisdictions, Alaska25 and Iowa26, 
provide that there is a presumption of neg-
ligence on the part of the employer when-
ever the employer fails to insure. Those 
jurisdictions which do not establish an ex-
ception to the exclusivity rule for failure to 
insure, provide injured employees with 
compensation benefits from other sources 
or hold the employer liable for compensa-
tion benefits even without insurance. 27 
Intentional Torts 
Most workers' compensation statutes 
provide for an exception to the exclusivity 
rule when the employer intentionally in-
flicts the injury on the employee. 28 Those 
jurisdictions not providing an exception 
for intentional torts generally allow for 
extra compensation when the employer's 
act is willful. The majority view is that the 
employer's conduct must be more than 
negligent for this· exception to apply.29 
The intentional tort exception is premised 
on the theory that the injury suffered can-
not be considered accidental. 30 Since most 
workers' compensation laws cover only 
accidental injuries, intentional torts are 
not within these statutes. In order for an 
employee to sue his employer for an inten-
tional tort, the employer's conduct must 
be "willful and deliberate." 31 
"Deliberate intention" requires that the 
employer "have formed a specific intent to 
injure an employee (or at least to injure 
someone)." 32 The majority rule is that "in-
juries caused by the gross, wanton, willful, 
deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable 
or malicious negligence, breach of statute, 
or other misconduct" on the part of the 
employer not amounting to "genuine in-
tentional injury", are still considered "ac-
cidental".33 Even a deliberate violation of 
a statute by an employer falls short of in-
tentional injury" are still considered "ac-
cidental." 33 Even a deliberate violation of 
the employer must actually desire to injure 
an employee in order for this exception to 
apply. This rule is followed by the major-
ity of jurisdictions regardless of the occa-
sional outrageous results, such as in the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia 
in Fowler v. Southern Wire & Iron, Inc. 3s 
In Fowler the president of Southern Wire 
& Iron, Inc. was sued by an employee on 
the theory that he willfully and intention-
ally caused the employee's injury. The 
Georgia Court of Appeals found that the 
employer had willfully injured the em-
ployee because the employee had refused 
to tum in the names of fellow employees 
who had attended a union meeting.36 The 
employer allegedly ordered the employee 
to work bare handed in a vat of acid. The 
Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the willful failure to keep a workplace 
safe did not amount to a deliberate inten-
tion to injure and thus no actual assault 
was made on the ~mployee. 37 
A different result was reached in Doney 
v. Tambouratgis 38 where the California 
Supreme Court found that an employee 
who had been assaulted by her employer 
could sue her employer outside of the work-
ers' compensation statute. 39 In Doney 
the injured employee was a nude dancer 
and cocktail waitress at the defendant's 
bar. One night after the bar closed for the 
evening, her employer requested that she 
"accompany him upstairs to his office to 
discuss a customer complaint."40 Once 
upstairs the employer attempted to rape 
her. The court permitted the employee to 
sue her employer for assault and battery, 
finding that the exclusive remedy section 
of California's workers' compensation act 
did not apply. 
In Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Del-
marva, Inc.,41 the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals held that "deliberate intention" to 
cause an employee's injury implies that 
there must be a "formation by the employer 
of a specific intention to cause injury or 
death combined with some action aimed at 
accomplishing such result, as opposed to 
mere employer negligence or gross negli-
gence." 42 In Johnson a sixteen year old em-
ployee was electrocuted while using a 
sump pump. Approximately, two months 
prior to this accident, the employer had 
been cited by the Maryland Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration 
(MOSHA) for the dangerous condition of 
the sump pump. Soon after the employer 
deliberately misinformed MOSHA that 
they had corrected this violation, Johnson 
was electrocuted. The Maryland Court of 
Appeals concluded that Maryland followed 
the majority view that "reckless, wanton or 
willful misconduct differs from inten-
tional wrongdoing."43 In so holding the 
court noted that to date only two states, 
Ohio and West Virginia, have permitted 
something less than an actual "deliberate 
intention" to injure to fulfill the inten-
tional tort exception. 44 
In Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron 
Chems., Inc., 45 the Ohio Supreme Court 
held that an employer could be held liable 
to an injured employee, outside of the 
workers' compensation act, if the em-
ployer knew or should hilVe known that 
unsafe work conditions existed which may 
injure an employee. In Mandalidis v. Elkins 
Indus., Inc.,46 the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals held that an employee 
could sue his employer for damages when 
the employer's conduct, which caused 
injury or death, was willful wanton and 
reckless. These expanded views, however, 
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are clearly the minority viewY Because 
the intentional tort exception is difficult to 
prove, injured employees often try to show 
that their injuries fall outside of workers' 
compensation statutes altogether. 
Dual Capacity 
A. Generally 
The dual capacity doctrine is possibly 
the most widely debated judicially cre-
ated exception to the exclusivity rule. The 
dual capacity doctrine is an attempt "to 
eliminate the discrepancy between the full 
tort remedy available to workers injured 
by third parties and the limited benefits 
available to workers injured in identical 
ways by employers." 48 Under this excep-
tion an employee injured during the course 
of employment by a piece of equipment 
which was manufactured by the employer, 
would be in the same position as an em-
ployee injured by that same equipment if 
manufactured by a third party. Both parties 
could sue the manufacturer in tort. In es-
sence, the dual capacity doctrine allows an 
employee to sue his employer, outside of 
the workers' compensation statute, when-
ever the employer stands in a capacity 
other than just an "employer" at the time 
of the injury of the employee. 49 The em-
ployer is therefore considered a third party 
and thus outside of the workers' com-
pensation statute. 50 
The dual capacity exception was first 
recognized in Duprey v. Shane. 51 In Du-
prey, a practical nurse working for a chiro-
practor was injured when she attempted to 
catch a patient who had fallen off the treat-
ment table. Her employer, in the course of 
attempting to treat her injuries, caused 
further injuries. The nurse sued her em-
ployer for medical malpractice. She alleged 
that the exclusive remedy provision of Cali-
fornia's Workers' Compensation Act was 
inapplicable when the employer was act-
ing as a "person other than the employer." 52 
The California court agreed with the em-
ployee, and held "that an employee injured 
in an industrial accident may sue the at-
tending physician for malpractice if the 
original injury is aggravated as a result of 
the doctor's negligence, and that such right 
exists whether the attending doctor is the 
insurance doctor or the employer." 53 Du-
prey was later cited with approval in Hoff-
man v. Rogers 54 which extended Duprey to 
include physicians who were also co-em-
ployees of the injured employee. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals found Duprey to 
be controlling, even though after Duprey 
was decided, the California legislature 
amended the Labor Code so that injuries 
caused by co-employees fell within the 
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Workers' Compensation Act. 55 The court 
held that: 
Following the decision in Duprey v. 
Shane . . . section 3601 of the Labor 
Code was amended to include a provi-
sion that when conditions for compen-
sation exist an employee who injures a 
fellow employee while acting in the 
scope of his employment shall not be 
liable unless he acted willfully or reck-
lessly or was intoxicated. That amend-
ment cannot be interpreted as over-
turning the rules established by the 
Duprey case. 56 
The reasoning in both Duprey and Hoff-
man have been criticized as irrational, in 
those states such as California,57 which 
have enacted workers' compensation 
statutes containing sections designed to 
exclude "coemployees from the range of 
usable parties." 58 Professor Larson in The 
Law of Workmen's Compensation stated that 
Hoffman, was the result of the Duprey 
court's "thoughtless extrapolation" of the 
dual capacity doctrine. 59 Evidently, the 
California legislature agreed that the Hoff-
man and Duprey decisions were incorrect, 
because in 1982 the California legislature 
rejected Duprey and the dual capacity doc-
trine. 60 
While Professor Larson is critical of Cal-
ifornia's interpretation of the dual capacity 
doctrine, he does not reject the doctrine 
completely. Instead, he states that "[s]ince 
the term 'dual capacity' has proven to be 
subject to such misapplication and abuse, 
the only effective remedy is to jettison it 
altogether, and substitUte the term 'dual 
persona doctrine.' n 61 Professor Larson's 
dual persona theory, which has been ac-
cepted in a few jurisdictions, allows an em-
ployer to be sued outside of workers' com-
pensation "if-and only if-he possesses 
a second persona so completely indepen-
dent from and unrelated to his status as 
employer that by established standards the 
law recognizes it as a separate legal per-
son." 62 
The reasoning Professor Larson gives 
for his position is his belief that courts 
have overexpanded the dual capacity doc-
trine. This overexpansion could ultimately 
destroy the exclusiveness of workers' com-
pensation because employers may have 
many capacities during "the course of a 
day's work-as iandowner, land occupier, 
products manufacturer, installer, modi-
fier, vendor, bailor, repairman, vehicle 
owner, shipowner, doctor, hospital, health 
services provider, self-insurer, safety in-
spector. . . ." 63 
B. Medical Malpractice 
Despite Professor Larson's criticisms of 
the dual capacity doctrine, this exception 
to the exclusive remedy rule has received 
favorable reception in a number of courts. 64 
One of the more common areas oflitigation 
wherein the doctrine is used is the area of 
medical malpractice. This doctrine has 
been applied where an employee is first in-
jured in the course of employment and is 
subsequently negligently treated by the 
employing hospital or doctor. 65 In Guy v. 
Arthur H. Thomas CO.,66 the Ohio Su-
preme Court allowed an employee to sue 
her employer for medical malpractice. In 
that case, the employee worked in a lab at 
Christ Hospital. She contracted mercury 
poisoning during her employment and 
sued the hospital for malpractice alleging 
that the hospital's failure to diagnose her 
injury led to an aggravation of that injury. 
The court found the hospital had acted in a 
dual capacity and at the time of the treat-
ment was acting as a hospital. 67 
In the malpractice area, many courts have 
accepted the dual capacity doctrine on the 
theory that the medical treatment by the 
employer or co-worker is separate from 
the employment relationship.68 Therefore, 
it is not uncommon in these situations for 
an injured worker to receive workers' com-
pensation benefits for the original injury, 
as well as recover in tort for the subsequent 
aggravation of the in jury. 69 In other cases 
an employer or co-employee may be liable 
for the tort claim but not under workers' 
compensation.70 However, the majority of 
jurisdictions reject the dual capacity rule 
altogether in the area of medical treat-
ment.71 
In McCormick v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 72 
it was held that an employee could not sue 
his employer for the negligent diagnosis 
and treatment of a work related foot injury. 
The Illinois court held that the dual ca-
pacity test is whether the employer's con-
duct in his second capacity, generates 
additional unrelated obligations from his 
ordinary obligations as employer.73 The 
court concluded by holding that the Illinois 
Workers' Compensation Act requires the 
furnishing of medical treatment to em-
ployees, and thus there was not an unre-
lated obligation. The fact that the em-
ployer provided these medical services 
himself did not change the employee's ex-
clusive remedy under the Act. The same 
conclusions reached in McCormick have 
also been reached in many other jurisdic-
tions. 74 
C. Products Liability 
Another area where the dual capacity ex-
ception has received some favorable recep-
tion is that of products liability. When an 
employee's injury is alleged to have been 
caused by a product which was manufac-
tured or modified by the employer, some 
courts have permitted employees to sue 
.. outside of workers' compensation. Within 
this area of the dual capacity exception, 
courts have distinguished between prod-
ucts manufactured or modified solely for 
the employer's use, and products manu-
factured for sale to the general public. 75 
When an employer manufactures or 
modifies machinery or equipment solely 
for the use in its own business, it has unani-
mously been held by those jurisdictions 
which have addressed the issue, that the 
dual capacity doctrine is inapplicable. 76 
An employee under these circumstances is 
not considered to have separate and dis-
tinct capacities as manufacturer and em-
ployer. 77 
In Stone v. United States Steel Corp., 78 an 
employee was injured when a steel plate, 
manufactured by the parent company of 
his employer, collapsed. The employee al-
leged that the exclusive remedy rule did 
not apply because his employer was acting 
in the capacity of manufacturer. The court 
ruled that the dual capacity rule did not 
apply because the employer's conduct in 
producing the steel plate did not create ob-
ligations apart from the ordinary employer-
employee relationship. The court found 
that the injuries arose out of "the very na-
ture of the work" and thus came within the 
workers' compensation scheme.79 
In Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machs., 
Inc.,80 the court held that workers' com-
pensation was the sole remedy of an em-
ployee who was injured during the course 
of employment by a drill hopper machine 
which was manufactured by the employer. 
In Goetz the employer had manufactured 
the defective machine for the use in its 
own plant and it was not offered for sale to 
the general public. The court recognized 
that in Illinois the dual capacity doctrine 
applies only when an employee is injured 
by "a breach of duty independent of the 
duty of an employer qua employer." 81 The 
court found that under the circumstances 
of this case the employee had not shown an 
independent duty outside of the duty as 
employer. The employer was not in the 
business of selling the allegedly defective 
machinery, and therefore the plaintiff could 
not sue outside of workers' compensa-
tion. 82 While jurisdictions which have de-
cided the issue agree that the dual capacity 
doctrine should not be applied when the 
employer manufactures a machine solely 
for his own use, two jurisdictions, Cali-
fornia and Ohio, have permitted an em-
ployee to sue his employer ifhe is injured 
by defects in products which were manu-
factured for the public.83 The reasoning in 
these cases is that an employer is deemed 
to have a separate and distinct duty to pro-
duce safe products, and shielding employ-
ers from employee suits would reduce the 
deterrent value of strict liability for defec-
tive products. 84 
In Mercer v. Uniroya~ Inc.,85 a truck-
driver for Uniroyal was injured in an acci-
dent caused by a tire blowout. The defec-
tive tire was supplied and manufactured 
by Uniroyal, and the truckdriver brought 
a products liability suit against his em-
ployer. The trial court granted Uniroyal's 
motion for summary judgment holding 
workers' compensation was the employee's 
exclusive remedy. The appellate court re-
versed holding that the injuries did not 
arise out of the employment relationship 
and that Uniroyal was acting in the capacity 
of manufacturer as well as employer.86 
This holding has now been limited by 
Bakonyi v. Ralston Purina CO.,87 where 
the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the 
dual capacity doctrine did not apply if an 
employment relationship predominated at 
the time of the injury.88 
In Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 89 
employees brought an action against their 
employer when scaffolding on which they 
were working collapsed. The trial court 
granted the employer's demurrer without 
leave to amend on the grounds that the 
employee's exclusive remedy was under 
workers' compensation.90 The court of ap-
peals for the fifth district reversed, holding 
that under the dual capacity doctrine: 
a plaintiff may state a cause of action 
(or causes of action) based on manu-
facturer's liability even though the de-
fendant is also the plaintifPs employer 
and the alleged injuries take place in 
the course of employment, provided 
that the product involved is manu-
factured by the employer for sale to the 
public rather than being manufactured 
for the sole use of the employee.91 
The Douglas decision was later upheld 
in Mareno v. Leslie's Pool Mart 92 and again 
in Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc. 93 In 1982 
the California legislature rejected the dual 
capacity doctrine, but made an exception 
for injuries caused by a defective product 
manufactured by the employer.94 Outside 
of Ohio and California, all other "Ameri-
can jurisdictions hold an employer, who is 
also the manufacturer, modifier, installer, 
or distributor of a product used in the 
work, cannot be held liable in damages to 
his own employee on the theory of prod-
ucts liability." 95 
D. Land Owners 
The dual capacity doctrine has also been 
asserted in cases where personal injury 
suits are brought against employers who 
were also the owners of the property on 
which the employee was injured. This ex-
ception to the exclusive remedy rule has 
generally been rejected.96 On the other 
hand, it has been held that injured long-
shoremen or harbor workers could main-
tain personal injury actions against vessel 
owners or operators outside of the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act.97 The reasoning behind 
these decisions is that employers, as vessel 
owners or operators, owe a duty to em-
ployees separate than that as employer. 98 
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E. Road Maintenance 
One final area where the dual capacity 
exception has been used in attempting to 
circumvent the exclusive remedy rule is in 
suits against state governments for negli-
gent maintenance of roads. Again the vir-
tually unanimous view is that government 
employees cannot sue their employers for 
failure to properly maintain the highway.99 
Bad Faith 
One of the newest recognized exceptions 
to the exclusive remedy rule is an action 
holding the self-insured employer or an 
employer's insurance carrier liable for act-
ing in bad faith. This cause of action is said 
to arise where an employer or carrier acts 
in bad faith in the payment, processing, in-
vestigation or settlement of a compensable 
injury.loo However, in actuality the bad 
faith exception is an extension of the gen-
erally accepted intentional tort exception. 
In most cases, bad faith suits are brought 
under the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. lol 
The leading case adopting the bad faith 
exception is generally considered to be 
Unruk v. Truck Ins. Exch. l02 In Unruk 
the plaintiff had suffered an industrial 
back injury. The insurer had the plaintiff 
placed under surveillance and one of the 
investigators allegedly talked the plain-
tiff into going to Disneyland where she 
was persuaded to cross a rope bridge. In 
her complaint the plaintiff alleged that she 
suffered physical injuries from her activ-
ities at Disneyland and suffered a mental 
breakdown because her activities were pho-
tographed. The court held that it could 
not give its "approval to such miscon-
duct which tramples upon the employee's 
rights," and therefore, the employee was 
permitted to hold the carrier liable in 
tort. 103 
Recently in Gallagher v. Bituminous Fire 
& Marine Ins.,104 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland recognized that an employer's in-
surer could be held liable for an intentional 
tort for the nonpayment of compensation 
awarded to an injured employee. In Gal-
lagher, the plaintiff injured his back while 
working as a carpenter for an employer 
who was insured for workers' compen-
sation by the defendant. Subsequent to his 
injury, the Maryland Workers' Com-
pensation Commission issued an award 
ordering the defendant to start paying 
temporary total disability benefits and to 
provide prompt medical treatment. It was 
not until two and a half months later, 
when the Commission again ordered tem-
porary total benefits and medical pay-
ments to be paid by the insurer, that the 
plaintiff began receiving benefits. In rec-
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ogmzmg that the plaintiff ~ay have a 
cause of action against the employer's in-
surer for emotional distress, the court 
stated that the original "back injury ... is 
separate from the alleged cause of the 
claimed tortious injury (intentional failure 
to pay). The language of Section 15 [ex-
clusive remedy provision] does not reach 
Gallagher's intentional tort claims." 105 In 
so holding, Maryland joined the fast grow-
ing number of states which recognize a bad 
faith exception to the exclusivity rule. 106 
Although the bad faith rule is considered 
to be a separate exception to the general ex-
clusivity rule, as previously stated it is 
merely an extention of the intentional tort 
exception. When the insurer's conduct does 
not rise to an intentional level, most juris-
dictions provide for statutory penalties 
only. These penalties are usually also ap-
plicable to the employer's conduct. 107 
Conclusion 
The courts' willingness to make excep-
tions to the exclusivity rule has shown that 
the present workers' compensation laws are 
not considered adequate or equitable by 
m~ny jurisdictions. Each of the carved out 
exceptions attempts to address a particu-
lar inequity by juxtaposing the workers' 
compensation system with the modern 
tort system. Despite the disparity between 
modern tort law recovery and workers' 
compensation recovery, and the injustice 
often caused by that disparity, most courts 
have abstained from creating exceptions to 
the exclusive remedy rule. As already 
noted, only a few jurisdictions have ac-
cepted the dual capacity doctrine. The bad 
faith exception has been adopted by a 
number of jurisdictions, but the bad faith 
exception is actually part of the intentional 
tort exception. While most jurisdictions 
do statutorily provide for an intentional 
tort exception, the reasoning for this ex-
ception is that the injury was not acci-
dental. Therefore, intentional torts are not 
an exception, but rather never fell within 
workers' compensation. 
In reality, workers' compensation is 
still the exclusive remedy for almost all 
work related injuries. "Judicial reluctance 
to adopt exceptions to the exclusive rem-
edy rule has stemmed from an unwilling-
ness to tamper with what courts see as the 
fixed terms of carefully designed legisla-
tive bargain underlying workers' compen-
sation." 108 Originally, the exclusive rem-
edy trade off was not much of a worker 
sacrifice when balanced against the unlike-
lihood of recovery under the old common 
law tort system. However, modern ex-
panded tort remedies have tipped the scale 
in favor of the employer in many instances. 
Just as the courts have been unwilling to 
accept the doctrinal exceptions to the ex-
clusivity rule, so too have the majority of 
state legislatures. This failure to reform 
was attributed by the National Commis-
sion on State Workmen's Compensation 
Laws to the lack of understanding, of rela-
tively complex workers' compensation 
laws, by state legislators. l09 Fortunately, 
although slow in coming, the movement 
by both the courts and state legislatures in 
recent years has been to modernize work-
ers' compensation acts.IIO 
Without substantial legislative moderni-
zation, the future of the exclusive remedy 
under Workers' Compensation laws is not 
bright. While the general rule is still a rule 
of exclusiveness, judicially created excep-
tions and piecemeal legislation have left 
too many uncertaintities and inconsis-
tencies. The exclusive remedy provision is 
part of the backbone of workers' compen-
sation laws and only time will tell just how 
far the courts will go in eroding this provi-
sion. 
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